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According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), loss of control in-flight
is the greatest cause of general aviation accidents. The purpose of this study was to
determine the most frequently occurring probable causes and contributing factors from
loss of control in-flight. This study used the Pareto principle and methodology developed
by the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee to analyze accidents retrieved from the
NTSB’s Aviation Accident Database. The results showed that 73% of the accidents
contained the contributing factor of “PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed” across the
three categories of reciprocating engine aircraft, turbine engine aircraft, and
experimental-amateur built (E-AB) aircraft. The results also showed that 50% of all the
accidents resulted from a pairing of “Pilot-Failure to maintain airspeed” and “PILOT –
Aerodynamic stall/spin.” Hypothesis testing showed very few statistically significant
differences among the three aircraft categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB). The study
concluded that resources should be allocated towards finding a solution for pilots’ failure
to maintain airspeed.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Although aviation safety has largely shifted to a proactive approach to preventing
accidents, a need still exists to analyze accident trends as a means to improve safety.
Through analysis of aircraft accident data, trends become apparent and changes can be
made to current operations to decrease fatality percentages. According to the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (2012), “General Aviation (GA) has the highest
aviation accident rate within civil aviation” (p. 1).
The GA Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), formed as a safety initiative of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was created to analyze GA accidents to provide
suggestions and recommendations for GA safety improvements in order to decrease the
fatality rates (Stephens, 2012). According to the FAA (2012), loss of control in-flight
(LOC-I) “continues to be the leading cause accounting for about 70% of all fatal GA
accidents” (para. 1). The high occurrence of LOC-I accidents has caught the attention of
the aviation community; thus, the GAJSC chose to focus its efforts on LOC-I accidents.
By means of Pareto analysis, the GAJSC was able to identify the most
frequently occurring phases of flight in which LOC-I led to a fatality (shown in
Figure 1). From the Pareto analysis, the GAJSC decided that the first area to
focus on in the LOC-I category would be the Approach and Landing (A&L) phase
of flight (GAJSC, 2012).
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Figure 1. Loss of Control – Inflight (LOC-I) events by flight phase 2001- 2010.
Adapted from Pilot-in-command: Avoiding Loss of Control Accidents by Stowell, 2012.

The GAJSC analyzed a random sample of fatal GA accidents in the LOC-I
category that occurred during A&L between the years 2001-2010. From the
GAJSC’s sample, each accident was coded from a list of Standard Problem
Statements (SPSs). Each SPS was assigned a number for statistical purposes.
After the accident event sequence for each accident had been classified, the
GAJSC then decided upon detailed implementation plans (DIPs) which were then
converted to recommendations on how to improve GA safety; these
recommendations were provided to the FAA.
Significance of the Study
According to the NTSB, GA has the highest accident rate in all of civil aviation.
The NTSB’s (2012) Improve General Aviation Safety webpage states that the rate of GA
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accidents is “6 times higher than for small commuter operators and 40 times higher than
for transport category operations” (para 4). The NTSB (2012) also states that:
Although the overall general aviation accident rate has remained relatively
steady at an average of 6.8 per 100,000 flight hours, the components of
that figure have changed dramatically over the last 10 years. In particular,
personal flying accident rates have increased 20%, while the fatal accident
rate has increased 25% over the same 10-year period. The NTSB sees this
statistic play out frequently, having investigated an average of 1,500
general aviation accidents each year, in which more than 400 pilots and
passengers are killed annually. (para. 4)
Resources limit the aviation community’s ability to conduct a study that attempts
to pinpoint areas where change is needed. It may be hard to find the necessary resources
to fund both a study and also implement the recommended changes; therefore, it is
imperative that these resources be allocated wisely when trying to address problems.
This study aims to use the Pareto principle to determine the hierarchy of probable
causes and contributing factors to fatal LOC-I during A&L accidents between the years
2001-2010. The Pareto principle will identify the most frequently occurring SPSs in the
sample, thus dividing the vital few and trivial many, and will allow the aviation
community to focus most of its efforts on the biggest problems.
Statement of the Problem
LOC-I has been the leading cause of fatalities in GA for over a decade (GAJSC,
2012). Analyzing the accidents to determine probable causes and contributing factors
enables researchers to identify the most significant areas that must be addressed to reduce

4
the number of GA fatalities. Researchers do not have a sufficient understanding of the
probable causes and contributing factors that occur in categories of reciprocating engine
aircraft (Recip), turbine engine aircraft (Turbine), and experimental-amateur built aircraft
(E-AB) to make sound decisions about where to invest time and resources to mitigate GA
fatalities. The problem identified for this study was to determine which of those probable
causes and contributing factors occurred in the categories of Recip, Turbine, and E-AB
within fatal GA accidents from LOC-I during A&L between the years 2001-2010.
Armed with this information and using the Pareto principle, the causes of LOC-I
accidents in GA can be identified and time and resources can be spent on the most
frequently occurring factors to begin mitigating GA fatalities.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to analyze the outputs, or assignments of Standard
Problem Statemens (SPSs), of a sampling process as recommended by Krejcie and
Morgan (1970) using only the NTSB’s probable cause reports (NTSB, 2013a). This
study paralleled a study conducted by the GAJSC, with the exception that this study
analyzed only the probable cause report whereas the GAJSC analyzed the entire aircraft
accident report. This study also differed from the GAJSC study in sampling
methodology, in that this study used a formula to calculate the minimum sample size
required and generated a random selection for each of the three categories accordingly,
whereas the GAJSC selected a random sample of 30 accidents in each category.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study analyzed four research questions and two hypotheses:
R1: What will be the highest occurring SPSs for fatal aircraft accidents between
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2001-2010 resulting from LOC-I during A&L?
R2: What will be the highest occurring SPSs in each of the three categories
(Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) for fatal aircraft accidents between 2001-2010
resulting from LOC-I during A&L?
R3: Will there be any observed pairs of SPSs for fatal aircraft accidents between
2001-2010 resulting from LOC-I during A&L?
R4: Will there be any observed pairs of SPSs in each of the three categories
(Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) for fatal aircraft accidents between 2001-2010
resulting from LOC-I during A&L?
H1. There will be a difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three
Categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents
occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010.
H2. There will be no difference in the rankings of SPSs among the three
categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents
occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010.
Delimitations
For this study, the full dataset used by the GAJSC was obtained. The dataset
contained all filed NTSB fatal GA LOC-I accidents occurring between 2001-2010. To
parallel the GAJSC study, only accidents that occurred during the A&L phase of flight
were used. Therefore, the criteria for selection were:
•

General Aviation

•

Accidents that occurred between 2001-2010

•

Primary Cause: Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I)
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•

During the Approach and Landing (A&L) phase of flight

The GAJSC chose to further sort its selections into three aircraft categories:
Recip, Turbine, and E-AB. The present study also utilized these three categories.
Limitations and Assumptions
Limitations of this study were restricted resources (time, money, and subject
matter experts) to analyze adequately all of the accidents and produce the outputs (SPS
assignments). To parallel the GAJSC study, the same group members should have
analyzed the accidents in the newly constructed samples, which could have outputs that
are more comparable. To overcome this limitation, the researcher worked with a highly
experienced collaborator. The researcher and collaborator performed consensus-based
analyses and ratings. It was assumed that the researcher and collaborator used rationale
similar to that of the GAJSC’s when determining the SPSs for each accident.
In addition, the researcher and collaborator did not possess the credentials either
to analyze aircraft accidents or to determine intervention strategies and recommendations
similar to those of the GAJSC. Therefore, the researcher and collaborator did not
replicate the entire GAJSC study. This study aimed to assign SPSs from the NTSB’s
(2013a) probable cause reports.
Furthermore, the list of SPSs that the GAJSC developed was an evolving list
during its study. Therefore, the present study was able to use the completed list, whereas
the GAJSC only had a partial list in the early stages of its accident investigation. Also,
the GAJSC did not go back through its LOC-I A&L study to update for newly-developed
SPSs. Consequently, the results of the assigned SPSs for this study may be skewed from
the GAJSC’s study.
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An additional limitation was the ability of the researcher to obtain full accident
reports from the NTSB (2013a) accident database, as not all reports are readily available
online and some must be requested from the NTSB. Therefore, for this study, the
researcher analyzed only the probable cause reports stored online on the NTSB’s (2013a)
accident database.
Assumptions of this study were that the NTSB’s (2013a) accident database is
valid and that the NTSB accurately investigated each accident and listed the necessary
details of each accident and its probable cause and contributing factors in the accident’s
probable cause report. This study also assumes that the Krejcie and Morgan (1970)
sample size equation is a valid equation for selecting sample sizes from a population.
Definitions of Terms
Approach for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR): “From the Initial Approach Fix
(IAF) to the beginning of the landing flare” (NTSB, 2011, p. 57).
Approach for Visual Flight Rules (VFR): “From the point of VFR pattern entry,
or 1,000 feet above the runway elevation, to the beginning of the
landing flare” (NTSB, 2011, p. 57).
General Aviation: “Any civil aircraft operation that is not covered by 14 CFR
Parts 121 or 135 (or Part 129, which applies to foreign air
carriers)” (NTSB, 2011, p. 5).
Landing:

“From the beginning of the landing flare until the aircraft exits the
landing runway, comes to a stop on the runway, or when power is
applied for takeoff in the case of a touch-and-go landing” (NTSB,
2011, p. 57).
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Loss of Control In-Flight: “Significant, unintended departure of the aircraft from
controlled flight, the operational flight envelope, or usual flight
attitudes” (Jacobson, 2010, slide 4).
List of Acronyms
A&L

Approach and Landing

AOPA

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

CAST

Commercial Aviation Safety Team

CGAR

Center of Excellence for General Aviation Research

CICTT

CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team

DIPs

Detailed Implementation Plans

EAA

Experimental Aircraft Association

E-AB

Experimental-Amateur Built

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

GA

General Aviation

GAJSC

General Aviation Joint Steering Committee

GAMA

General Aviation Manufacturers Association

HAI

Helicopter Association International

IAF

Initial Approach Fix

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

JIMDAT

Joint Implementation Monitoring Data Analysis Team

JSAT

Joint Safety Analysis Team
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JSIT

Joint Safety Implementation Team

LOC-I

Loss of Control In-flight

LOCWG

Loss of Control Working Group

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATA

National Air Transportation Association

NBAA

National Business Aviation Association

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

NWS

National Weather Service

SAMA

Small Aircraft Manufacturers Association

SAT

Safety Analysis Team

SE

Standard Error

SEs

Safety Enhancements

SPSs

Standard Problem Statements

SPSS

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

VFR

Visual Flight Rules
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
LOC-I has consistently been the leading cause of GA fatalities over the last
decade (2001-2010), resulting in 1,259 fatal accidents (GAJSC, 2012). The FAA
established the GAJSC under the Safer Skies initiative in an effort to mitigate the rate of
fatalities in GA accidents (GAJSC, 2012). Recent efforts of the GAJSC have focused on
LOC-I and its sub-categories such as A&L, maneuvering, enroute, takeoff, etc. This
study will focus only on the GAJSC’s LOC-I A&L study.
Loss of Control In-Flight
According to the FAA (2012), LOC-I “continues to be the leading cause
accounting for about 70% of all fatal GA accidents” (para. 1). Figure 2 shows the
number of GA fatal accidents by the top five Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(CAST)/International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Common Taxonomy Team
(CICTT) occurrences. CICTT is a team of aviation industry leaders from around the
world that works towards developing common taxonomies and definitions for the
purposes of standardizing accident and incident reporting (Fattah & Stephens, n.d.). In
Figure 2, there are three times as many LOC-I fatal accidents than any other CICTT
occurrence category. The high occurrence of LOC-I accidents is of significant concern
for the aviation community, and this is where the GAJSC chose to focus.
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Figure 2. GA fatal accidents occurring between 2001-2010 by top ten CICTT occurrence
categories. Adapted from Washington’s Likely Impact on the Future of General Aviation
and Flight Training by Bunce, 2012.

Jacobson (2010), the Loss of Control Study Team Lead at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Dryden Flight Research Center,
presented two definitions for LOC-I. The first definition, provided by a CAST report,
includes a “significant, unintended departure of the aircraft from controlled flight, the
operational flight envelope, or usual flight attitudes…” (as cited in Jacobson, 2010, slide
four). However, Jacobson (2010) also reported that an Airplane Upset Recovery Training
Aid defined LOC-I through general unintentional conditions that describe an airplane
upset using measurable characteristics:
•

Pitch attitude greater than 25 degrees nose up

•

Pitch attitude greater than 10 degrees nose down

•

Bank angle greater than 45 degrees

•

Within the above parameters, but flying at airspeeds inappropriate for
the conditions (slide 5).
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Belcastro and Foster (2010) stated that the difficulty in understanding LOC-I is
the dynamic nature in which aircraft accidents occurred. Aircraft accidents often
occurred after a culmination of events rather than from a single causal factor. Without
one causal factor, one single solution does not exist. Therefore, a need exists to analyze
each individual LOC-I accident to understand properly all of the underlying conditions
present. Mitigating LOC-I accidents necessitates quantifying qualitative data (i.e.,
creating a type of system to numerically quantify an accident narrative). Belcastro and
Foster’s (2010) study analyzed accident report narratives and each accident’s contributing
factors were categorized into three categories: adverse onboard conditions, external
hazards and disturbances, and vehicle upsets (p. 3). This method allowed researchers and
aircraft safety analysts to identify the most frequently occurring contributing factors and
to determine a proper implementation strategy for the reduction of LOC-I fatalities
(Belcastro & Foster, 2010).
CAST
It is important to review the CAST and its research methodology, as CAST
provided the methodological foundation for the GAJSC, and ultimately, this study.
According to the CAST (2011) website, CAST was formed by the FAA in 1998
following two government reports on aviation safety: The White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security Report and The National Civil Aviation Commission Review.
CAST’s first goal was to reduce the number of fatalities in commercial aviation by 80%
by the year 2008. In addition, CAST claims that “the work of the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team (CAST), along with new aircraft, regulations and other activities, reduced
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the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the United States by 83% from 1998 to 2008”
(Duquette, 2011, p. 1).
Additionally, the CAST Fact Sheet stated that the group determines which
accident and incident trends justify immediate action through a detailed analysis process
(Duquette, 2011). Duquette (2011) detailed the CAST analysis process:
CAST has reduced the risk in commercial aviation by focusing on
controlled flight into terrain, A&L accidents, loss of control, weather,
turbulence, [and much more by using] a disciplined, data driven, and
focused approach of:
•

analysis of past accidents/incidents;

•

identification of accident precursors;

•

development of specific safety enhancements to address precursors
and contributing factors;

•

implementation of cost effective safety enhancements;

•

tracking implementation for effectiveness; and

•

using knowledge gained to continually improve the aviation
system. (para. 7)

CAST categorizes each accident into standard problem statements (SPSs);
examples can be found in Appendix A. Once each accident has been classified with its
proper SPS, the group then analyzes the reoccurring theme (e.g., improper use of
standard radio phraseology) and determines an appropriate Safety Enhancement to
recommend to the FAA and aviation community (CAST, 2011).
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CAST is split into three working groups: Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT),
Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT), and Joint Implementation Monitoring Data
Analysis Team (JIMDAT). These working groups allow the CAST to divide the tasks
into data analysis, safety enhancement development, and development of master safety
plans which measure effectiveness and identify future areas to study (Duquette, 2011).
CAST is composed of many top aviation industry officials from organizations such as:
Aerospace Industries Association, Airbus, Airports Council International, Air Transport
Association, The Boeing Company, Flight Safety Foundation, General Electric
(representing all engine manufacturers), National Air Carrier Association, Regional
Airline Association, and many more (Duquette, 2011).
GAJSC
In the mid-1990s, the GAJSC was formed and modeled after the CAST. The
GAJSC and its CAST counterparts are shown in Figure 3. Though the GAJSC was
formed in the mid-1990s, interest in the committee declined and the committee became
inactive. However, through a series of years that indicated a large increase in fatalities
for GA, the FAA reestablished the committee.
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Figure 3. Comparison of the CAST and GAJSC working groups. Adapted from The GA
JSC SAT and Working Group Processes by C. Stephens, 2012.

According to the GAJSC Charter, the committee “is the primary vehicle for
government-industry cooperation, communication, and coordination on GA accident
mitigation” (FAA, 2006, p. 1). The GAJSC includes members from many prominent
aviation entities including the FAA, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA),
Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), General Aviation Manufacturers Association
(GAMA), Helicopter Association International (HAI), National Air Transportation
Association (NATA), National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), National Weather Service (NWS), and Small
Aircraft Manufacturers Association (SAMA) (FAA, 2006).
According to the FAA (2006), the GAJSC is a means to reduce GA accident
fatalities through detailed analysis of GA accident/incident trends that govern the areas of
emphasis for the GAJSC as well as the FAA and, thus, sharing their findings with the GA
community. When reinstated by the FAA in 2011, the GAJSC focused its first study on
determining the primary cause for GA fatal accidents (GAJSC, 2012). The results
showed that LOC-I was the leading cause for GA fatalities (FAA, 2011). As a result, the
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committee decided to analyze LOC-I accidents by flight phase categories: maneuvering,
approach, enroute, initial climb, takeoff, uncontrolled descent, landing, and others (FAA,
2011). Though maneuvering was the leading phase for LOC-I accidents, the GAJSC
decided to focus on LOC during the approach and landing phase of flight because of its
applicability to the three main GA communities of Recip, Turbine, and E-AB aircraft
(GAJSC, 2012).
The GAJSC LOC-I A&L final report. The GAJSC compiled the fatal GA
accidents between the years 2001-2010 that resulted from LOC-I during A&L. The
accident dataset contained 1,259 LOC-I accidents. When the committee narrowed down
the dataset to show only LOC-I accidents occurring during A&L, the population was
reduced to 279. The GAJSC stratified the population into three sub-categories:
reciprocating engine aircraft, turbine aircraft, and E-AB aircraft.
The GAJSC developed a sampling methodology for accident selection. According
to the GAJSC’s final report (2013):
If the resultant search query from the NTSB's database exceeds thirty (30)
separate accident reports, a random sample of the available reports will be
collected. The random sample shall include a minimum of thirty (30) samples. If
thirty (30) reports are not available, Non-Fatal accidents may be used to bring the
total sample size to thirty (30). In addition, the SAT may decide that a separate
and additional sample involving Amateur Built aircraft be utilized.
A software tool, such as Microsoft's Excel or IBM's SPSS, will be used to
randomize and select the sample. The randomizing shall only use the NTSB
report number, and once run, shall constitute the master list of accident reports
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that will be used for analysis. Further information within the accident report will
be accessed only after the master list is compiled. (p. A4-2)
Due to restrictions of time and resources, the GAJSC selected 60 accidents for
turbine engine, 60 accidents for reciprocating engine aircraft, and 60 accidents for aircraft
in the E-AB category (GAJSC, 2012). However, only “the first 30 well documented
accidents from this list were analyzed in detail” (GAJSC, 2012). When the random
samples were established, the committee analyzed each of the 90 accidents and
categorized the event sequence by issuing SPSs (see Appendix A for a full list of SPSs).
The GAJSC’s methodology for the A&L study (2012) states that:
Three subteams of the LOCWG membership (reciprocating non E-AB,
experimental amateur built, and turbine) were assigned a set of 30 accident
reports to analyze. Each subteam developed an event sequence spreadsheet…
Each spreadsheet included the events necessary to provide context for
understanding the nature of the accident sequence. The subteams then evaluated
the events to determine if they represented a “problem” involving
hardware/software failure or human execution errors, decisions, or procedural
non-compliance.
If the subteam members considered an event was contributory to the accident,
they developed a statement describing why it contributed to the accident. They
identified the specific nature of the problem associated with an event in the
sequence along with the factors that could have precipitated the problem. These
contributing factors were then restated in more general terms as standard problem
statements to make them relevant beyond the specific accident. (p. 6)
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According to the GAJSC (2012) Loss of Control Work Group Approach and
Landing report, the GAJSC developed a rating scale for the SPSs along with potential
interventions for each problem. After all of the accidents had been categorized by SPSs,
the GAJSC then identified intervention strategies and rated the anticipated effectiveness
of each intervention strategy. These interventions were then used to develop a set of
Safety Enhancements (SEs) (Stephens, 2012).
After the development of the SEs was completed, the GAJSC then “developed
mitigations based on problems found and built Detailed Implementation Plans (DIPs)”
(Fazio, 2012, p. 8). The intended DIP’s process is to detail mitigations and the steps
towards implementations that are evaluated on resources and benefits (Fazio, 2012).
NTSB Aviation Accident Reporting
According to the NTSB website (2013b):
The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with
investigating every civil aviation accident in the U.S. and significant accidents in
other modes of transportation-railroad, highway, marine and pipeline. The NTSB
determines the probable cause of each accident investigated and issues safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. (para. 2)
The NTSB does not have regulatory power to make changes within the
transportation industry; the NTSB can only provide recommendations for changes
(NTSB, 2013c). According to the NTSB (2013c) website, The NTSB’s “effectiveness
depends on [its] reputation for conducting thorough, accurate, and independent
investigations and for producing timely, well-considered recommendations to enhance
transportation safety” (para. 7).
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The final product of an NTSB accident investigation is the accident final report.
According to the NTSB (2013d) Accident Report website:
Accident Reports are one of the main products of an NTSB investigation. Reports
provide details about the accident, analysis of the factual data, conclusions and the
probable cause of the accident, and the related safety recommendations. Most
reports focus on a single accident, though the NTSB also produces reports
addressing issues common to a set of similar accidents. (para. 1)
According to the NTSB (2013e), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
Any person has a right, enforceable in court, to obtain access to federal agency
records, except to the extent that such records (or portions of them) are protected
from public disclosure by one of nine exemptions or by one of three special law
enforcement record exclusions. (para. 1)
Due to the FOIA, “the NTSB has been proactively posting public docket
information on the accidents and incidents investigated by the Safety Board… since July
1, 2009” (NTSB, 2013e, para. 7). Furthermore, the NTSB (2013a) states:
The NTSB aviation accident database contains information from 1962 and later
about civil aviation accidents and selected incidents within the United States, its
territories and possessions, and in international waters. Generally,
a preliminary report is available online within a few days of an accident.
Factual information is added when available, and when the investigation is
completed, the preliminary report is replaced with a final description of the
accident and its probable cause. Full narrative descriptions may not be available
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for dates before 1993, cases under revision, or where NTSB did not have primary
investigative responsibility. (para. 1)
Sampling
Ravid (2011) defines a sample as a small, yet representable portion that can be
used to make inferences about a population as a whole. Without a correct sample size,
predictions about the population as a whole become distorted and inaccurate. The
generic term for the predictions about the population as whole is called generalizability
(Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011). Remler and Van Ryzin (2011) explained that
generalizability could also be referred to as external validity. The external validity
“illustrates the concept of...projecting the results of one study to a much larger reality”
(Remler &Van Ryzin, 2011, p. 140).
Furthermore, Remler and Van Ryzin (2011) stated that during statistical tests,
researchers try to analyze the significance of a statement about a population. This
statement is referred to as a null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is a claim made about a
population being observed and is usually stated as “there is no difference” (p. 273).
When running statistical tests, the results will either cause the researcher to fail to reject
the null hypothesis, meaning there is no statistically significant difference, or reject the
null hypothesis, indicating that a statistically significant difference does exist.
Moreover, errors can be made in hypotheses testing when a researcher rejects the
null hypothesis by claiming a difference exists when there is none (Type I error) or when
the researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis by failing to recognize a difference (Type
II error) (Banerjee, Chitnis, Jadhav, Bhawalkar, & Chaudhury, 2009). To reduce the
chance of committing a Type I or Type II error, a greater sample size should be selected
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(i.e., larger samples mean that there is less chance that a given sample is significantly
different from the population) (Banerjee et al., 2009).
Determining sample size. In Practical Sampling by Henry (1990), “sample size
it the most potent method of achieving estimates that are sufficiently precise and reliable
for policy decisions or scientific study” (p. 117). Henry also added that as the sample
size increases, the standard error (SE) decreases; also, when determining sample size
…the tolerable error of the estimates or power of the analysis must be
made. The determination of tolerable error or power needs for a policy
study tends to be defined more by the use for the information in the
particular situation at hand than by conventional standards. (p. 117)
Henry (1990) continued that, though increasing the sample size does reduce error,
larger samples could also increase the resources (such as time and money) that are needed
for the study (p. 117). Similarly, Good and Hardin (2006) indicated that
…to determine the optimal sample size for testing a hypothesis, [the following
must be specified]:
•

Desired power and significance level

•

Distributions of the observables

•

Statistical test(s) that will be employed

•

Whether each comparison is formulated as a one-tailed or a two-tailed test.
(p. 31)
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Further, Good and Hardin (2006) stated that
…to determine the optimal sample size for providing a confidence interval, [the
following must be specified]:
•

Desired level of confidence

•

Desired width of the interval

•

Distributions of the observables. (p. 31)

Random sampling. A random sample, explained by Polonsky and Waller
(2011), “is a sampling procedure in which each element of the population has the same
probabilistic chance of being selected for the sample” (p. 140). Stratified sampling,
where the population is divided into subgroups (Polonsky & Waller, 2011), was used by
the GAJSC to sub-divide the population into the three subgroups as mentioned earlier
(GAJSC, 2012). Polonsky and Waller (2011) also provide a list of strengths and
weaknesses for each sampling method (see Table 1).

Table 1
Strengths and Weaknesses for Random and Stratified Sampling
Technique
Random Sampling

Strengths
Easily understood
Results are projectable

Weaknesses
Difficult to construct sampling
frame,
Expensive,
Lower precision
No assurance of
representativeness
Stratified Sampling Precise
Difficult to select relevant
Includes all important substratification variables,
Not feasible to stratify on many
populations
variables,
Expensive
Note. Adapted from Designing and Managing a Research Project by M. J. Polonsky and
D. S. Waller, 2011, p. 141.
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Krejcie and Morgan (1970) offer the following equation (referred to as
Equation 1) for easily determining an appropriate sample size:

𝑠 =

𝑋 2 × 𝑁 × 𝑃(1 − 𝑃)
(𝑑2 (𝑁 − 1)) + (𝑋 2 × 𝑃(1 − 𝑃))

(1)

Where:
s = required sample size.
X2 = the table value of Chi-square for one degree of freedom at the desired
confidence level (3.841).
N = the population size.
P = the population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the
maximum sample size).
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05)
Chuan (2006) compared sample sizes, calculated using Equation 1, and the Cohen
Statistical Power Analysis. In Cohen’s (1992) A Power Primer, he explains that,
“Statistical power analysis exploits the relationships among the four variables involved in
statistical inference: sample size (N), significance criterion (α), population effect size
(ES), and statistical power” (p. 156). Cohen elaborated that in research studies, it is
sometimes more beneficial to determine the sample size by using predetermined levels of
significance, effect size, and power. Furthermore, Chuan (2006) reported that four
factors determine sample size: “(1) how much sampling error can be tolerated; (2)
population size; (3) how varied the population is with respect to the characteristics of

24
interest; and (4) the smallest subgroup within the sample for which estimates are needed”
(p. 79). Cohen (as cited in Chuan, 2006) determined that the following were acceptable
levels for research: a significance level (alpha or α) set at .05, a medium effect size of .30
for product-moment analysis (Pearson’s Correlation), a medium effect size of .15 for
regression analysis, and desired power of .80 (β = .20). Chuan (2006) was able to
conclude that, for a population of 500, Equation 1 yielded a sample size of 217.
However, Cohen’s Statistical Power Analysis resulted in 85 samples for a correlational
study and 116 samples for a regression study. Chuan (2006) justified using a range of
85-116 (depending on the type of statistical test: correlation or regression) as suggested
by Cohen’s Statistical Power Analysis by stating:
First, Cohen is not only concerned about the magnitude with regards to the
statistical test results and its accompanying ρ value (as most researchers are) but
also the existence of the phenomenon understudied by considering additional
factors such as population effect size and the statistical power. In most research,
significance testing is heavily preferred to confidence interval estimation (Cohen,
1992). They failed to consider the importance of effect size and the statistical
power, which has been established in the preceding section. (p. 84)
Chuan (2006) suggests that reasons for opting for the smaller sample size
determined by Cohen’s Statistical Power Analysis versus the larger size determined by
Equation 1 would be based on the researcher's time, resources, and money required for
the experiment. Sometimes these extraneous factors do influence the sample size that can
be handled by the researcher. It is up to the researcher to determine the ‘middle ground’
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in order to conduct and follow proper research methodology while using the minimal
amount of resources required (Chuan, 2006).
Pareto’s Principle (80/20 Rule)
Pareto’s principle is used to conduct a Pareto analysis. According to Ziarati
(2006), Pareto analysis “is based on the proven Pareto principle that 20% of sources
cause 80% of the problems” (p. 2). Using Pareto analysis techniques can help determine
the factors that can produce the greatest results if remedied (p. 2).
Juran (1954) advanced the Pareto principle and its universal applications. Juran
coined the terms “vital few and trivial many” as they apply to the principle. Juran (1954)
states that, “the practical expression of this principle is the preparation of a written list of
the problems in order of their importance = the types of accidents in order of frequency,
the types of defects in order of amount of loss caused, the elements of cost in order of
amount, etc.” (p. 3). Juran explains that, “the written list automatically shows the ‘vital
few’ at the head of the list; the ‘trivial many’ are at the foot of the list” (p. 3).
Additionally, Juran (1954) explains that:
The vital few must be identified if program of improvement, of planning, or
control is to succeed. The trivial many must be identified if there is to be any
balance between the cost of planning and control vs. the value of planning and
control... The importance of the vital few lies in the fact that nothing of
significance can happen unless it happens to the vital few. (p. 3)
Summary
LOC-I comprised 70% of all GA fatal accidents between the years 2001-2010. In
efforts to reduce the fatality rate in the LOC-I and GA accidents overall, the FAA enlisted
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the help and expertise of the GAJSC. Upon initial review, the GAJSC chose to focus its
efforts on the LOC-I accidents occurring during the A&L portion of flight.
Out of the 276 accidents in the population of GA fatal accidents occurring from
LOC-I on A&L between 2001-2010, the GAJSC’s study analyzed 30 accidents for
turbine engine, 30 accidents for reciprocating engine aircraft, and 30 accidents for aircraft
in the E-AB category (GAJSC, 2012). When the random samples were established, the
committee analyzed each of the 90 accidents and categorized the event sequence by
issuing SPSs. After all of the accidents had been categorized by SPSs, the GAJSC then
identified intervention strategies and rated the anticipated effectiveness of each
intervention strategy. Therefore, the SPSs provide the foundation on which the GAJSC
based its findings and recommendations to the FAA.
Equation 1 details a strict process to use in order to select a sample size that will
give an accurate representation of the population within a desired level of confidence and
degree of accuracy. A combination of using Equation 1 to determine the sample sizes
needed, as well as using the NTSB probable cause reports, provided the guidelines for
this study’s development of SPSs. In addition, the use of a Pareto analysis helped
identify the top occurrences of probable causes and contributing factors for fatal GA
accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010.
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Chapter III
Methodology
The purpose of this study was to analyze the outputs (SPS assignments) of a
sampling process as recommended by Equation 1 using only the NTSB’s probable cause
reports (NTSB, 2013a).
Research Approach
The present study paralleled the GAJSC’s study. The accident data were
qualitative in nature from the narratives of the NTSB from each of the accidents. In a
manner similar to the GAJSC, this study quantified the qualitative data by categorizing
each event sequence using the same list of SPSs that was developed by the GAJSC.
Design and procedures. For this study, the full accident dataset used by the
GAJSC was obtained. The criterion for selection from the NTSB Aviation Accident
Database and Synopses (NTSB, 2013a) was:
•

General Aviation

•

Accidents that occurred between 2001-2010

•

Primary Cause: Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I)

•

During the Approach and Landing (A&L) phase of flight

The GAJSC chose to sort its selections further into three categories: reciprocating
engine aircraft, turbine engine aircraft, and experimental-amateur built aircraft. This
study also utilized these three categories. The researcher then selected random samples
from each of the three categories using Equation 1.
Once the random samples had been selected, the researcher and collaborator held
a training session to analyze non-sampled accidents that had been analyzed by the
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GAJSC to get into the same mindset as the GAJSC working group. Once the researcher
and collaborator had assigned the respective SPSs for the selected training-session
accidents, the results were informally compared to the GAJSC’s. This methodology
acted as a calibration for the researcher and collaborator to link to the approach of the
GAJSC when assigning SPSs.
After initial training was completed, the researcher and a collaborator worked
side-by-side to analyze each accident. The researcher and collaborator independently
reviewed each accident and assigned SPSs according to their own interpretation.
Subsequently, the researcher and collaborator compared their individual SPSs and agreed
by a consensus on the SPSs for each accident.
When all accidents were assigned SPSs, the researcher analyzed the data. SPS
assignments were examined by total assigned, percentage of occurrence in the accidents,
and by each category to analyze the results. The researcher also analyzed separate pairs
of SPSs to determine if there was a common pair of SPSs that occurred in the accident
data.
Population/Sample
The population of this study was derived from the NTSB Aviation Accident
Database and Synopses (NTSB, 2013a). Queries were run to select all GA fatal
accidents between the years 2001-2010 for the loss of control in-flight, during A&L
category. This population resulted in 267 accidents. These accidents were subdivided, or
stratified, into aircraft with reciprocal engines (n = 181), aircraft with turbine engines (n
= 28), and E-AB aircraft (n = 58). A stratified random sample of each category using
Equation 1 was generated for this study. According to Remler and Van Ryzin (2011), “in
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stratified sampling, a sample is drawn separately from each group” (p. 170). Therefore,
this study used Equation 1 to determine the appropriate sample size needed for each
category: reciprocal engine aircraft, turbine aircraft, and E-AB aircraft.
Upon examination of the data, 10 accidents were discarded because they lacked
necessary information, occurred in the wrong phase of flight, or contained misclassified
data. In the reciprocal engine aircraft category, four accidents were discarded, which
brought the final population to 177. According to Equation 1, a population of 177
requires a sample size of n = 121. Replacements were randomly selected.
In the turbine aircraft category, two accidents were discarded, which brought the
population for turbine aircraft to n = 26. According to Equation 1, a population of 26
requires a sample size of n = 24. Replacements were randomly selected.
In the E-AB aircraft category, four accidents were discarded, which brought the
final population to 54. According to Equation 1, a population of 54 requires a sample
size of n = 48. Replacements were randomly selected. Table 2 summarizes the
populations and samples.

Table 2
Population and Sample Sizes as Determined by Equation 1

Recip
Turbine
E-AB
Totals

Population
Original
181
28
58
267

Population
Adjusted
177
26
54
257

Sample Size
121
24
48
193
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The categories’ percentages of the population are depicted in Figure 4. As shown
in Figure 4, the category Recip makes up 63% of the population; this causes the data to
reflect largely only the Recip category when SPSs are studied as a whole.

25%

12%
Turbine
Recip
63%

E-AB

Figure 4. Depiction of the population stratified into the three categories.

Sources of the Data
The accident data that was used for this study was obtained from the NTSB’s
online Aviation Accident Database and Synopses (NTSB, 2013a). Only the accidents’
probable cause reports were used in this study, as they are made publicly available. All
accidents that were analyzed in this study can be found in Appendix B.
Treatment of the Data
Descriptive statistics. The treatment of data included analyzing the most
frequently occurring SPSs, most frequently occurring pairs of SPSs, and most frequently
occurring SPSs by each category. Results were shown in frequency tables to show the
highest frequency SPS, the number of times that SPS appeared in the accident data, the
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percentage of that SPS to the total assigned SPSs, as well as the percentage of the SPS by
the total number of accidents.
The researcher also sorted the results to show the most frequently occurring SPS
along with each of the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB). The results were
presented in frequency tables to show the highest frequency SPS, the number of times
that SPS appeared in the accident data, along with the counts of that SPS by category and
the categories’ percentage of that SPS.
In addition, the researcher also analyzed the data to determine if specific pairs of
SPSs were prominent in the dataset. The results were depicted by a frequency table that
contained the pair, its frequency of occurrence, and its percentage of occurrence by total
of accidents.
Hypothesis testing. The difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three
Categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I
during A&L between 2001-2010 was tested using Chi-square. The difference in the
rankings of SPSs among the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA
accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010 was tested using a
Friedman’s test followed by a post-hoc Chi-square to locate where the significance was.
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Chapter IV
Results
After assigning SPSs to each of the 193 accidents, the researcher analyzed the
data for SPS assignments by total, SPS assignments by category, as well as the
occurrence of SPS pairs in the accident dataset. The results are as follows.
Descriptive Statistics
The researcher and collaborator assigned SPSs to each of the 193 accidents.
There were 784 total SPSs assigned in the dataset. In Recip, there were 496 assigned
SPSs; in Turbine, there were 117 assigned SPSs; and in E-AB, there were 171 assigned
SPSs. In addition to the three categories, the SPSs also contained specific classifications:
Pilot, Environmental, Aircraft, ATC, Builder, and Organization. Table 3 shows the
classifications of SPS and their occurrences in the dataset.

Table 3
Major SPS Classification Totals

Recip (496)
Turbine (117)
E-AB (171)
Total (784)

Pilot
426 (86%)
99 (85%)
158 (92%)
683 (87%)

Environ.
45 (9%)
14 (12%)
4 (2%)
63 (8%)

Aircraft
22 (4%)
4 (3%)
7 (4%)
33 (4%)

ATC
2 (.4%)
0
0
2 (.3%)

Builder
0
0
2 (1%)
2 (.3%)

Org
1 (.2%)
0
0
1 (.1%)

Furthermore, the SPS assignments were sorted by most frequently occurring SPS.
Table 4 shows the most frequently occurring SPS along with its total SPS assignments,
percentage of that SPS by the total SPS assignments (n = 784), and percentage of that
SPS in the accident dataset (n = 193).
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Table 4
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs
SPS

SPS Description

18
5

PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed
PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin
PILOT - Aeronautical Decision MakingPoor Judgment
WEATHER - Significant weather
(SIGMET)
PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to
recognize and execute corrective action
PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach
PILOT - Intentional non-compliance
PILOT - Improper preflight planning
PILOT - Loss of situational awareness
PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft
systems and limitations
PILOT - Low pilot time in make and
model
PILOT - Spatial disorientation
AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power
PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured
for specific operation
PILOT - Operated aircraft while under
influence of unauthorized prescription
drugs
PILOT - Recency of
experience/proficiency
PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention
PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene
AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained /
repaired
PILOT - Improper Go Around
PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs
and/or their effects on pilot performance
PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low
and/or slow
PILOT - Improper traffic pattern
procedures
PILOT - Failure to follow procedure

7
45
4
50
52
22
33
9
1
60
17
25
47
2
3
40
43
49
31
14
20
36

SPS
Totals

% of Assigned
SPSs (784)

% of Occurrence
in Accidents (193)

141
100

17.98%
12.76%

73.06%
51.81%

62

7.91%

32.12%

56

7.14%

29.02%

38

4.85%

19.69%

36
29
28
25

4.59%
3.70%
3.57%
3.19%

18.65%
15.03%
14.51%
12.95%

21

2.68%

10.88%

19

2.42%

9.84%

19
17

2.42%
2.17%

9.84%
8.81%

16

2.04%

8.29%

15

1.91%

7.77%

12

1.53%

6.22%

12
12

1.53%
1.53%

6.22%
6.22%

12

1.53%

6.22%

12

1.53%

6.22%

10

1.28%

5.18%

9

1.15%

4.66%

8

1.02%

4.15%

8

1.02%

4.15%

Note. Only those SPSs that are above 1.0% of assigned SPSs are listed in this table. A
full table of all SPSs can be found in Appendix A.
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For the 193 accidents, a total of 784 SPSs were assigned. Table 5 shows the
number of accidents in each category along with the number of SPSs that were assigned
in each category.

Table 5
Number of Assigned SPSs by Category

Recip
Turbine
E-AB
Total

# of Accidents in each
Category
121
24
48
193

# of SPSs in each
Category
496
117
171
784

The most frequently occurring SPSs were also calculated by each category as
shown in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8. Tables 6, 7, and 8 follow the same layout and
show the SPS total by category, followed by the categories’ percentage of each SPS and,
finally, the percentage of the categories’ SPS in the accident dataset (n = 193).

35
Table 6
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs and Recip Category Totals and Percentages.
SPS #
18
5

SPS Description

20

PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed
PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin
PILOT - Aeronautical Decision
Making- Poor Judgment
WEATHER - Significant weather
(SIGMET)
PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to
recognize and execute corrective action
PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized
approach
PILOT - Intentional non-compliance
PILOT - Improper preflight planning
PILOT - Loss of situational awareness
PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft
systems and limitations
PILOT - Low pilot time in make and
model
Pilot - Spatial disorientation
AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power
PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured
for specific operation
PILOT - Operated aircraft while under
influence of unauthorized prescription
drugs
PILOT - Recency of
experience/proficiency
PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention
PILOT - Failure of instructor to
intervene
AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained /
repaired
PILOT - Improper Go Around
PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs
and/or their effects on pilot performance
PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low
and/or slow
PILOT - Improper traffic pattern
procedures

36

PILOT - Failure to follow procedure

7
45
4
50
52
22
33
9
1
60
17
25

47
2
3
40
43
49
31
14

Total
SPSs
141
100
62
56
38
36
29
28
25
21
19
19
17
16

Recip
SPSs
85
64

% R SPS
(496)
17.1%
12.9%

% R Acc.
(121)
70.2%
52.9%

44

8.9%

36.4%

41

8.3%

33.9%

18

3.6%

14.9%

21
15
20
15

4.2%
3.0%
4.0%
3.0%

17.4%
12.4%
16.5%
12.4%

11

2.2%

9.1%

7
17
12

1.4%
3.4%
2.4%

5.8%
14.0%
9.9%

11

2.2%

9.1%

11

2.2%

9.1%

10
8

2.0%
1.6%

8.3%
6.6%

10

2.0%

8.3%

8
10

1.6%
2.0%

6.6%
8.3%

8

1.6%

6.6%

7

1.4%

5.8%

2

0.4%

1.7%

3

0.6%

2.5%

15
12
12
12
12
12
10
9
8
8

Note. R = Recip = Reciprocating Engine Aircraft. Acc = Accident.

36
Table 7
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs and Turbine Category Totals and Percentages.
SPS #

SPS Description

18
5
7

PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed
PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin
PILOT - Aeronautical Decision MakingPoor Judgment
WEATHER - Significant weather
(SIGMET)
PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to
recognize and execute corrective action
PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach
PILOT - Intentional non-compliance
PILOT - Improper preflight planning
PILOT - Loss of situational awareness
PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft
systems and limitations
PILOT - Low pilot time in make and
model
Pilot - Spatial disorientation
AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power
PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured
for specific operation
PILOT - Operated aircraft while under
influence of unauthorized prescription
drugs
PILOT - Recency of
experience/proficiency
PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention
PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene
AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained /
repaired
PILOT - Improper Go Around
PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs
and/or their effects on pilot performance
PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low
and/or slow
PILOT - Improper traffic pattern
procedures
PILOT - Failure to follow procedure

45
4
50
52
22
33
9
1
60
17
25
47

2
3
40
43
49
31
14
20
36

Total
SPSs
141
100
62

Turbine
SPSs
17
6
8

% T SPS
(117)
14.5%
5.1%
6.8%

% T Acc.
(24)
70.8%
25.0%
33.3%

56

11

9.4%

45.8%

38

11

9.4%

45.8%

36
29
28
25
21

8
4
3
7
3

6.8%
3.4%
2.6%
6.0%
2.6%

33.3%
16.7%
12.5%
29.2%
12.5%

19

1

0.9%

4.2%

19
17
16

0
2
3

0.0%
1.7%
2.6%

0.0%
8.3%
12.5%

15

3

2.6%

12.5%

12

1

0.9%

4.2%

12
12
12

3
1
1

2.6%
0.9%
0.9%

12.5%
4.2%
4.2%

12
10

2
1

1.7%
0.9%

8.3%
4.2%

9

1

0.9%

4.2%

8

3

2.6%

12.5%

8

4

3.4%

16.7%

Note. T = Turbine = Turbine Engine Aircraft. Acc = Accident.
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Table 8
Most Frequently Occurring SPSs and E-AB Category Totals and Percentages.
SPS #

SPS Description

18
5
7

PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed
PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin
PILOT - Aeronautical Decision MakingPoor Judgment
WEATHER - Significant weather
(SIGMET)
PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to
recognize and execute corrective action
PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach
PILOT - Intentional non-compliance
PILOT - Improper preflight planning
PILOT - Loss of situational awareness
PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft
systems and limitations
PILOT - Low pilot time in make and
model
Pilot - Spatial disorientation
AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power
PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured
for specific operation
PILOT - Operated aircraft while under
influence of unauthorized prescription
drugs
PILOT - Recency of
experience/proficiency
PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention
PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene
AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained /
repaired
PILOT - Improper Go Around
PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs
and/or their effects on pilot performance
PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low
and/or slow
PILOT - Improper traffic pattern
procedures
PILOT - Failure to follow procedure
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4
50
52
22
33
9
1
60
17
25
47

2
3
40
43
49
31
14
20
36

Total
SPSs
141
100
62

E-AB
SPSs
39
30
10

% E-AB
SPSs (171)
17.5%
5.8%

% E-AB
Acc. (48)
81.3%
62.5%
20.8%

22.8%

56

4

2.3%

8.3%

38

9

5.3%

18.8%

36
29
28
25
21

7
10
5
3
7

4.1%
5.8%
2.9%
1.8%
4.1%

14.6%
20.8%
10.4%
6.3%
14.6%

19

11

6.4%

22.9%

19
17
16

2
3
2

1.2%
1.8%
1.2%

4.2%
6.3%
4.2%

15

1

0.6%

2.1%

12

1

0.6%

2.1%

12
12
12

1
1
3

0.6%
0.6%
1.8%

2.1%
2.1%
6.3%

12
10

0
1

0.0%
0.6%

0.0%
2.1%

9

1

0.6%

2.1%

8

3

1.8%

6.3%

8

1

0.6%

2.1%

Note. E-AB = Experimental-Amateur Built Aircraft. Acc = Accident.
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The researcher also selected the top 10 most frequently occurring SPSs in each category
as shown in Table 9.

Table 9
Top Ten Most Frequently Occurring SPSs by Category
Recip SPS
SPS SPS Description

SPS

18

PILOT - Failure to
maintain airspeed
PILOT - Aerodynamic
Stall/Spin

18

7

PILOT - Aeronautical
Decision MakingPoor Judgment

4

45

WEATHER Significant weather
(SIGMET)

7

50

PILOT - Failure fly a
stabilized approach

50

22

PILOT - Improper
preflight planning

4

PILOT - Aerodynamic
stall - failure to
recognize and execute
corrective action

60

Pilot - Spatial
disorientation

52

PILOT - Intentional
non-compliance

33

PILOT - Loss of
situational awareness

5

Turbine SPS
SPS Description

SPS

PILOT - Failure to
maintain airspeed
WEATHER Significant weather
(SIGMET)
PILOT Aerodynamic stall failure to recognize
and execute corrective
action
PILOT - Aeronautical
Decision MakingPoor Judgment

18

PILOT - Failure fly a
stabilized approach
PILOT - Loss of
situational awareness

52

5

PILOT Aerodynamic
Stall/Spin

50

52

PILOT - Intentional
non-compliance

9

36

PILOT - Failure to
follow procedure

22

22

PILOT - Improper
preflight planning

45

45

33

5

1

7

4

E-AB SPS
SPS Description
PILOT - Failure to
maintain airspeed
PILOT Aerodynamic
Stall/Spin
PILOT - Low pilot
time in make and
model

PILOT Aeronautical
Decision MakingPoor Judgment
PILOT - Intentional
non-compliance
PILOT Aerodynamic stall failure to recognize
and execute
corrective action
PILOT - Failure fly
a stabilized
approach
PILOT - Lack of
knowledge of
aircraft systems and
limitations
PILOT - Improper
preflight planning
WEATHER Significant weather
(SIGMET)
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In addition to individual SPS assignments, the researcher also analyzed the dataset to
determine if any specific pairs of SPSs occurred in the data set. The researcher found a
total of 405 unlike pairs which existed in the dataset. Table 10 shows only the 10 most
frequently occurring SPS pairs followed by Tables 11, 12, and 13 which show the top 10
most frequently occurring SPS pairs in each of the three categories.

Table 10
Top Ten Most Frequently Occurring SPS Pairs
Pairs of
Frequency % of Accidents
SPSs
(193)
5,18
99
51.3
4,18
37
19.2
18,45
33
17.1
7,18
33
17.1
18,50
26
13.5
7,45
26
13.5
5,7
24
12.4
Note. A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.

Table 11
Top Ten Pairs of SPSs within Recip Accidents
Pairs of
Frequency
% of Recip
SPSs
Acc. (121)
5,18
64
52.9
7,18
23
19.0
18,45
22
18.2
7,45
20
16.5
4,18
18
14.9
5,7
17
14.0
18,50
14
11.6
18,22
13
10.7
5,45
13
10.7
Note. A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 12
Top Ten Pairs of SPSs within Turbine Accidents
Pairs of Frequency % of Turbine
SPSs
Acc. (24)
4,18
10
41.7
18,45
9
37.5
18,50
6
25.0
4,45
5
20.8
5,18
5
20.8
18,33
4
16.7
36,52
4
16.7
45,50
4
16.7
7,18
4
16.7
7,45
4
16.7
Note. A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.

Table 13
Top Ten Pairs of SPSs within E-AB Accidents
Paris of
Frequency
% of E-AB
SPSs
Acc. (48)
5,18
30
62.5
4,18
9
18.8
1,18
8
16.7
1,5
7
14.6
18,52
7
14.6
18,50
6
12.5
5,50
6
12.5
5,52
6
12.5
7,18
6
12.5
5,7
5
10.4
Note. A full list of SPSs can be found in Appendix A.

Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1. A Chi-square test was used to test the null hypothesis: There will
be no difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three Categories (Recip, Turbine,
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and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between
2001-2010. The alpha level was set to α = 0.05. Table 14 displays the results from the
most frequently occurring SPSs and their respective Chi-square results. The Chi-square
test failed to reject the null hypothesis for all of the SPSs, except for SPS 1 (PILOT- Low
time in make and model) and SPS 5 (PILOT- Stall/Spin), which showed statistically
significant results.

Table 14
Chi-Square Results for Hypothesis One
SPS #
18
5
7
45
4
50
52
22
33
9
1
60
17
25
47
2
3
40
43
49
31
14
20
36
*p < .05.

R % SPS
17.14
12.90
8.87
8.27
3.63
4.23
3.02
4.03
3.02
2.22
1.41
3.43
2.42
2.22
2.22
2.02
1.61
2.02
1.61
2.02
1.61
1.41
0.40
0.60

T % SPS
14.53
5.13
6.84
9.40
9.40
6.84
3.42
2.56
5.98
2.56
0.85
0.00
1.71
2.56
2.56
0.85
2.56
0.85
0.85
1.71
0.85
0.85
2.56
3.42

E-AB % SPS
22.81
17.54
5.85
2.34
5.26
4.09
5.85
2.92
1.75
4.09
6.43
1.17
1.75
1.17
0.58
0.58
0.58
0.58
1.75
0.00
0.58
0.58
1.75
0.58

X2
1.97
6.64
0.66
4.31
2.90
0.94
1.14
0.37
2.62
0.67
6.51
3.96
0.16
0.53
1.25
1.04
1.23
1.00
0.33
1.90
0.56
0.37
1.51
3.46

Sig.
0.37
0.04*
0.72
0.12
0.23
0.62
0.57
0.83
0.27
0.71
0.04*
0.14
0.92
0.77
0.54
0.61
0.54
0.61
0.85
0.39
0.76
0.83
0.47
0.18
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Hypothesis 2. A Friedman test was used to examine the null hypothesis: There
will be no difference in the rankings of SPSs among the three categories (Recip, Turbine,
and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 20012010. The results of the Friedman’s test depicted a significant observation. A post-hoc
Chi-square was run to pinpoint the data that contained a significant difference. Table 15
depicts the results.

Table 15
Post-hoc Results of Friedman’s Test for Hypothesis 2
SPS

Recip
Turbine
Rank
Rank
18
1
1
5
2
7
7
3
4
45
4
2
4
7
3
50
5
5
52
10
8
22
6
10
33
9
6
9
12
11
1
21
25
60
8
33
17
11
17
25
13
12
47
14
13
2
15
21
3
18
14
40
16
22
43
20
24
49
17
18
31
19
23
14
22
26
20
28
16
36
26
9
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

E-AB
Rank
1
2
4
10
6
7
5
9
11
8
3
17
13
16
22
24
23
25
14
36
26
27
12
21

X2
0.00
4.56
0.18
6.50
1.63
0.47
1.65
1.04
1.46
0.84
16.82
16.59
1.37
0.63
2.98
2.10
2.22
2.00
2.62
9.66
1.09
0.56
7.43
8.18

Sig.
1.00
0.10
0.91
0.04*
0.44
0.79
0.44
0.59
0.48
0.66
0.0002***
0.0003***
0.51
0.73
0.23
0.35
0.33
0.37
0.27
0.008**
0.58
0.76
0.02*
0.02*
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The data collected in this study allowed the researcher to develop discussion
points and draw conclusions from the results of the 193 accidents and their assigned
SPSs.
Discussion
There were several differences between the present study and the GAJSC’s A&L
study; some of these are shown in Table 16. Importantly, the sample size of the present
study (193) was calculated to have a confindence interval of 95% and a margin of error of
3.5%; the GAJSC WG sample size (90) was found to have a confidence interval of 90%
and a margin of error of 8.4%. Though the differences between the two studies prohibit a
statistical validation of methodologies, the acceptable margin of error should be
determined a priori.

Table 16
Comparisons of Present Study and GAJSC A&L Study
Present Study

GAJSC WG

Larger sample size (193/257)

Smaller sample size (90/267)

Stratified Random Sampling

Random Sampling

Margin of error 3.5%

Margin of error 8.4%

Analyzed probable cause reports

Analyzed full accident report

Used a fully developed list of SPSs

Developed list of SPSs as needed

Did not use duplicate SPSs in an accident

Assigned duplicate SPSs in accidents

Conducted inter-rater calibration sessions

Did not formally calibrate raters

Only analyzed SPSs and their occurrences

Developed intervention strategies
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Descriptive statistics. This research was able to identify the most frequently occurring
underlying contributing factors using the Pareto analysis to analyze the probable cause
reports from the NTSB for 193 fatal GA LOC-I accidents occurring on A&L between
2001-2010. The accident dataset analyzed in this study contained 63% reciprocating
engine aircraft accidents. When examining the accident data as a whole, it is imperative
to keep in mind the heavy influence of the Recip category over the other categories,
Turbine and E-AB.
Among the different SPS classifications (Pilot, Environment, Aircraft, ATC,
Builder, and Organization), the most frequently occurring classification was Pilot (87%),
which concurs with the literature that approximately 80% of fatal GA accidents are
attributed to pilot error (Dismukes, 2010). Subsequently, the data was analyzed for the
highest frequency SPSs. The data indicated that the most frequently occurring SPS was
PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed (SPS 18) followed by PILOT – Aerodynamic
Stall/Spin (SPS 5). Both SPS 18 and SPS 5 validate the population of the study because
both are compatible with regard to the main causes of an aircraft in a loss of control
situation. Three of the major classifications (Pilot, Environment, and Aircraft) accounted
for more than 99% of the assigned SPSs.
Most frequently occurring SPSs. The analysis of the most frequently occurring
SPSs within the dataset reveals that a remarkable 73% of the 193 accidents involved SPS
18 (PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed). The implications of the high rate of failures to
maintain airspeed indicate that solving this problem alone could remedy a majority of
LOC-I accidents during A&L. Many flight schools, including Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, recognize the benefit of implementing airspeed monitoring/alert
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devices (such as angle of attack indicators) on aircraft for airspeed/stall prevention
training (K. Byrnes, personal communication, June 25, 2013).
The second most frequently occurring SPS in the dataset (52% of accidents) is
SPS 5 (PILOT – Aerodynamic stall/spin). Stall/spin accidents are considered an effect of
the failures to maintain airspeed; therefore, if one can solve the airspeed issue, one can
also avoid the second most frequent problem.
The third most frequently occurring issue in the dataset (32% of accidents) is SPS
7 (PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making – Poor Judgment). Aeronautical decisionmaking is often addressed by scenario-based training, in which pilots are forced to act
quickly on vital in-flight decisions (Harris, 1994). Some of the instances in which SPS 7
was designated to an accident, involved a chain of poor decisions before the aircraft was
even started:
•

improper pre-flights (SPS 22)

•

operating while not feeling well (SPS 21)

•

operating while using over-the-counter, unauthorized prescription, or
illegal drugs (SPS 31, SPS 47, and SPS 19 respectively)

•

significant weather (SPS 45).

SPS 45: (Weather – Significant weather) is the fourth leading cause (29%) of fatal
LOC-I during A&L accidents. The importance of understanding the implications of
weather and formulating educated in-flight decisions regarding weather must be
understood on various levels. In several instances, pilots without Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) training found themselves in circumstances of deteriorating weather. Instead of
choosing an alternate airport, pilots flew into the weather, often lost situational awareness

46
(SPS 33), became spatially disoriented (SPS 60), or attempted to land while on an
unstabilized approach (SPS 50 and 53). In certain circumstances, attempting to land from
an unstabilized approach could be considered intentional non-compliance (SPS 52).
However, in nearly all of the weather-related cases, some form of poor decision-making
was exhibited.
Differences among the most frequently occurring SPSs by category. Due to
the large number of Recip accidents in the dataset, it is important to examine the
differences in most frequently occurring SPSs as they appear in each category; that is, the
hierarchy of SPS occurrences is not the same across each of the three categories with one
exception. The notable exception is that SPS 18 (PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed)
is the most frequently occurring SPS across all three categories. The distribution for SPS
18 in the three categories is Recip = 70.8 %, Turbine = 70.2%, and E-AB = 81.3%.
The differences described below are shown in Table 8, while Tables 5-7 show the
actual percentages. Subsequently, the researcher observed that Turbine aircraft
experienced an aerodynamic stall (no spin) more frequently than Recip and E-AB aircraft
(Turbine = 45%, Recip = 14%, E-AB = 18%). In addition, Turbine aircraft experienced
fewer aerodynamic stall/spins than did Recip and E-AB aircraft (Turbine = 25%, Recip =
52%, E-AB = 62%). The researcher also observed that SPS 60 (PILOT – Spatial
disorientation) occurred at a greater rate in Recip accidents (14%) than in Turbine (0%)
and E-AB (4%) accidents.
A few SPSs occurred at higher rates in Turbine accidents than in Recip and E-AB
accidents. These include:
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•

SPS 50: Unstable approaches (Turbine = 33%, Recip = 12%, and E-AB =
14%)

•

SPS 60: Loss of situational awareness (Turbine = 29%, Recip = 12%, and
E-AB = 6%)

•

SPS 36: Failure to follow procedure (Turbine = 17%, Recip = 3%, and
E-AB = 2%)

Other notable differences in highest occurring SPSs across the three categories are
as follows:
•

SPS 7: PILOT- Aeronautical decision making/poor judgment” occurred at
nearly the same frequency in Recip and Turbine aircraft (36% and 33%,
respectively) but only in 20% of E-AB aircraft.

•

SPS 45: Weather occurred at a higher rate in Recip and Turbine aircraft
(34% and 46%, respectively) compared to only 8% for E-AB aircraft.

•

SPS 22: Improper pre-flights also occurred at a slightly higher rate in
Recip and Turbine accidents (17% and 16%, respectively) than in E-AB
accidents (10%).

•

SPS 52: PILOT – Intentional non-compliance occurred at a slightly higher
frequency in E-AB accidents (20%) than in Recip (12%) and Turbine
(16%) accidents.

•

E-AB accidents contained more factors relating to aircraft familiarization
than did accidents occurring in the Recip and Turbine categories. For
example, it was observed that E-AB experienced SPS 1 (PILOT – Low
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pilot time in make and model) in 23% of accidents, yet SPS 1 occurred in
less than 5% of Recip and Turbine accidents.
•

E-AB accidents experienced SPS 9 (PILOT – Lack of knowledge of
aircraft systems and limitations) in 14% of accidents compared to Recip
(9%) and Turbine (12%) accidents.

Most frequently occurring pairs of SPSs. The researcher also analyzed the
dataset to determine if any specific pairs of SPSs occurred in the dataset. The data
showed an outstanding validation that the most frequently occurring pair of SPSs was
SPS 5 (PILOT - Stall/Spin) and SPS 18 (PILOT – Failure to maintain airspeed). This
pair was also the highest frequency pair in the Recip and E-AB categories at 53% and
63%, respectively. However, in the Turbine category, the most frequently occurring pair
was SPS 4 (Pilot- Aerodynamic stall) and SPS 18 (PILOT – Failure to maintain
airspeed). These findings continue to indicate the need for improvement in maintaining
airspeed.
Hypothesis testing. The researcher used a Chi-square test to examine Hypothesis
1 - no difference in percent of assigned SPSs among the three Categories (Recip, Turbine,
and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from LOC-I during A&L between 20012010. The results showed that only two of the SPSs (SPS 1 and SPS 5) contained a
statistically significant difference. For SPS 1 (PILOT – Low time make/model) the
results indicate that there are significantly more occurrences of SPS 1 in the E-AB
category, compared to the other two categories. This is expected because of the nature of
E-AB flights; many pilots either construct their own E-AB aircraft (which they have
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never flown prior) or will purchase an E-AB airplane in which they have little or no
experience.
The researcher tested Hypothesis 2 - no difference in the rankings of SPSs among
the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB) within fatal GA accidents occurring from
LOC-I during A&L between 2001-2010. The analysis revealed there were statistically
significant differences in the rankings of SPS 45, SPS 1, SPS 60, SPS 20, SPS 49, and
SPS 36 among the three categories (Recip, Turbine, and E-AB).
Regarding SPS 45 (Weather – Significant weather), the distribution of rankings
was Recip = 4, Turbine = 2, and E-AB = 10, which conveys that SPS 45 was ranked
significantly lower in the E-AB category compared to the Recip and Turbine categories.
This observance is typical since E-AB flights generally take place in Visual Flight Rules
(VFR) weather.
For SPS 1 (PILOT – Low pilot time in make and model), the distribution of
rankings was Recip = 21, Turbine = 25, and E-AB = 3, which conveys that SPS 1 was
ranked significantly higher in the E-AB category compared to the Recip and Turbine
categories. This observation is expected because most pilots will either build their own
E-AB aircraft (which they have never flown prior) or will purchase an E-AB airplane, a
make/model in which they have little or no experience.
For SPS 60 (PILOT – Spatial disorientation), the distribution of rankings was
Recip = 8, Turbine = 33, and E-AB = 17, which conveys that SPS 60 was ranked
significantly lower in the Turbine category compared to the Recip and E-AB categories.
This observation concludes that spatial disorientation occurs less frequently in turbine
LOC-I accidents than in Recip or E-AB LOC-I accidents.
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For SPS 49 (PILOT – Improper Go Around), the distribution of rankings was
Recip = 17, Turbine = 18, and E-AB = 36, which conveys that SPS 49 was ranked
significantly lower in the E-AB category compared to the Recip and Turbine categories.
For SPS 20 (PILOT – Improper traffic pattern procedures), the distribution of
rankings was Recip = 28, Turbine = 16, and E-AB = 12, which conveys that SPS 20 was
ranked significantly lower in the Recip category compared to the Turbine and E-AB
categories.
For SPS 36 (PILOT – Failure to follow procedure), the distribution of rankings
was Recip = 26, Turbine = 9, and E-AB = 21, which conveys that SPS 36 was ranked
significantly higher in the Turbine category compared to the Recip and E-AB categories.
Conclusions
If the aviation community wishes to take immediate action to reduce LOC-I
fatalities, the initiative should start with airspeed awareness training. In all of the
analyses from this study, it was observed repeatedly, not only in the dataset as a whole,
but also in each of the three different categories, that pilots’ failure to maintain airspeed is
the greatest problem. By solving this one problem alone, 70-80% of all fatal GA LOC-I
during A&L accidents could be preventable. Following intervention strategies towards
failure to maintain airspeed, one should concentrate on other areas for each of the three
categories:
•

In the Recip category, attention should be focused on aeronautical
decision-making, proper pre-flight procedures, and spatial disorientation.

•

In the Turbine category, focus should be placed on weather on final
approach and flying via IFR. In many of the accidents presented in this
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study, pilots in Turbine accidents lost situational awareness while in IFR
conditions, resulting in a failure to recognize the aircraft stalling.
•

In the E-AB category, emphasis should be placed on familiarizing pilots
with a new aircraft before embarking on any type of flight. Emphasis
should also be placed on intentional non-compliance.

Recommendations
Based on the researcher’s experience from this study, several recommendations
can be provided for further examination. Primarily, this study demonstrated the
importance of using standard statistical sampling and analysis methods; in order to be
defensible, future studies should utilize well-designed and validated research
methodologies.
Should additional research be conducted using the methodology from this study,
the researchers should consider validity and reliability of the list of SPSs developed by
the GAJSC. An exhaustive literature review will prove beneficial to building a
comprehensive list of SPSs. If the list of SPSs used in this study is continued, it should
be updated to reduce duplicate statements (e.g., SPS 50: “PILOT – Failure to fly a
stabilized approach” and SPS 53: “PILOT – Unstabilized approach”). In this study, the
researcher sometimes could not identify an SPS that accurately represented a situation.
Further development of the SPS list (Appendix A) will provide a strong foundation for
analyzing accidents. Additionally, should the list of SPSs be updated, the previous
study/ies should be re-evaluated to reflect the updated list.
When examining the GAJSC study, the researcher noticed SPSs recorded multiple
times in a given accident. The repeated occurrence of duplicate SPSs in accidents should
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be questioned in regard to proper statistical methodology. A more robust methodology
should be developed for issuance of SPSs to include interrater-reliability testing. The
methodology should include detailed instructions about when and when not to assign an
SPS to an accident as well as a training session to ensure that the researcher(s) is(are)
properly calibrated to the methodology. Building a stronger statistical framework will
strengthen the findings and conclusions of future studies.
This study analyzed only the probable cause reports of the accidents. An analysis
of the probable cause reports proved to be beneficial in saving resources, thus allowing
the researcher to review an adequate sample size. If further research were done, it would
be helpful to determine if any insight can be gained from analyzing the entire accident
docket compared to analyzing only the probable cause reports.
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Standard Problem Statements
1

PILOT - Low pilot time in make and model

2

PILOT - Recency of experience/proficiency

3

PILOT - Distraction/Divided attention

4

PILOT - Aerodynamic stall - failure to recognize and execute corrective action

5

PILOT - Aerodynamic Stall/Spin

6

AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM - Failure of air traffic control to provide instructions/information/
clearances using standard and unambiguous phraseology in accordance with appropriate
regulatory directives.

7

9

PILOT - Aeronautical Decision Making- Poor Judgment
AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM – Air traffic system procedures that may compromise safety or
increase flight crew workload (e.g. noise abatement procedures, slam dunk approaches,
inappropriate taxi routes during low visibility operations, etc.).
PILOT - Lack of knowledge of aircraft systems and limitations

10

PILOT - Lateral imbalance

11

PILOT - Failure to acknowledge traffic and maintain separation.

12

PILOT - Different types of operations in close proximity

13

PILOT - Failure of third party to voice concerns

14

PILOT - Evasive maneuver when low and/or slow

15

PILOT - Wake turbulence

16

PILOT - Flight testing at low altitude

17

AIRCRAFT - Loss of engine power

18

PILOT - Failure to maintain airspeed

19

PILOT - Operated aircraft while under influence of illegal drugs

20

PILOT - Improper traffic pattern procedures

21

PILOT - Not feeling well

22

PILOT - Improper preflight planning

23

PILOT - Recency of night experience

24

PILOT - Lack of aeronautical knowledge

25

PILOT - Aircraft improperly configured for specific operation

26

PILOT - Inadequate/missing transition training

27

WEATHER SERVICE - Inaccurate forecast

28

ENVIRONMENTAL - Weather deterioration

29

PILOT - Overload

30

PILOT - Lack of assertiveness/command with ATC

31

PILOT - Use of over-the-counter drugs and/or their effects on pilot performance

8
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32

PILOT - Lack of piloting ability

33

PILOT - Loss of situational awareness

34

PILOT - Failure to verify information

35

PILOT - Inadequate/improper training

36

PILOT - Failure to follow procedure

37

AIRCRAFT - Powerplant control malfunction

38

PILOT - Fatigue

39

PILOT - Poor safety culture

40

PILOT - Failure of instructor to intervene

41

AIRCRAFT - System component failure - non powerplant

42

PILOT - Failure to test/inspect aircraft after maintenance

43

AIRCRAFT - Improperly maintained / repaired

44

PILOT - Lack of CRM

45

WEATHER - Significant weather (SIGMET)

46

INFRASTRUCTURE/NAVAID - Out of service and/or malfunctioning

47

PILOT - Operated aircraft while under influence of unauthorized prescription drugs

48

PILOT - Low pilot time in complex / high performance

49

PILOT - Improper Go Around

50

PILOT - Failure fly a stabilized approach

51

PILOT - runway incursion

52

PILOT - Intentional non-compliance

53

PILOT - Unstabilized approach

54

AIRCAFT - Unsafe flying characteristics

55

PILOT - Attention Allocation

56

AIRCRAFT - No Stall Warning System installed

57

ORGANIZATION - No or poor safety culture

58

FAA - ASI lack of knowledge of type of aircraft and certification requirements

59

BUILDER- Lack of knowledge of aircraft systems and limitations

60

Pilot - Spatial disorientation

61

PILOT - Failed to monitor fuel level
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Table B1
Recip Category Accident Set
NTSB
DFW07FA036
CHI06FA186
CHI05FA103
CHI02FA009
SEA08FA036
ATL01FA036
NYC03FA203
NYC01FA223
NYC03FA024
NYC04FA170
LAX02FA061
ANC04FA021
LAX08FA092
DFW06FA136
CHI05FA199
MIA04FA047
CHI05FA260
IAD01FA038

AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL
CESSNA 310Q
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. SR-22
CESSNA 150M
BEECH 58
CESSNA 177
CESSNA 421
CESSNA 402C
PIPER PA-31-350
SOCATA TB-20
PIPER PA-32R-301T
CESSNA T337H
BEECH J35
BEECH 95-B55
CESSNA 150F
GLASAIR GS-2
PIPER PA-23-160
PIPER PA-32-300
PIPER PA-28-RT201

NYC03FA022

CESSNA 182D

MIA06FA069
FTW02FA113
LAX04FA162
FTW03FA037
IAD05LA126
CHI07FA084
LAX06FA126
MIA02FA170
NYC07FA159
FTW04FA045
MIA08FA091
CHI06FA076
LAX05FA262
FTW03FA051
SEA07FA031
DEN07FA059

CESSNA 340A
BEECH D-45
MOONEY M20K
CESSNA 152
CESSNA 172H
BEECH 58
CESSNA 414A
BEAGLE AIRCRAFT B-206 SERIES 2
MOONEY M20F
CESSNA 172K
AEROFAB LAKE LA-250
CESSNA 421B
PIPER PA-28-235
PIPER PA-34-220T
PIPER PA-28-140
BEECH H-18

CITY, STATE
WACO, TX
EDGEWATER, MD
FESTUS, MO
DUBUQUE, IA
AUBURN, CA
MUNFORD, AL
NANTUCKET, MA
BERN TOWNSHIP, PA
MASSENA, NY
WHEELING, WV
BUENA PARK, CA
PENSACOLA, FL
BENSON, AZ
LEVELLAND, TX
WAUTOMA, WI
LAKE WORTH, FL
WABASH, IN
MANASSAS, VA
NEW PHILADELPHIA,
OH
MELBOURNE, FL
MINDEN, LA
LOS ANGELES, CA
JUSTIN, TX
CORRY, PA
MUNSTER, IN
KAHULUI, HI
MCALPIN, FL
BROOKS, KY
GRAND SALINE, TX
SKANEATELES, NY
WHEELING, IL
BIG BEAR CITY, CA
MCALESTER, OK
BANDON, OR
GREAT BEND, KS
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NYC01FA169
IAD03FA053
FTW02FA071
DFW06LA041
MIA02FA045
CHI08FA053
FTW04FA038
CHI01FA093
MIA05FA045
DEN03FA040
IAD02FA037
NYC08FA046
SEA08FA013
ATL06FA122
DEN02FA034
LAX06FA089
ATL04FA079
NYC03LA054
SEA03FA042
SEA04FA031
CHI06FA154
CHI07FA046

GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-1C
BEECH 24R
BEECH C23
BOEING A75N1 (PT17)
PIPER PA-32-260
BEECH V35B
PIPER PA-28-140
CESSNA 172H
PIPER PA-28-140
BEECH V35B
CESSNA 172P
CESSNA 310R
GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-5A
PIPER PA-32RT-300
CESSNA 340
PIPER PA-30
CESSNA 210
CESSNA 182P
PIPER PA-34-220T
PIPER PA-44-180
PIPER PA-32R-301T
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 114

DFW05FA251

CESSNA 150M

CHI04FA255
LAX05FA193
CHI06FA032
DEN06FA111
FTW01FA117
LAX05FA079
DFW05FA152
LAX04FA241
NYC07FA100
MIA08FA081
CHI08FA061
NYC03FA079
CHI07FA073
ATL06FA102
ATL02FA171
CHI01FA206

CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. SR-22
MOONEY M20C
AERO COMMANDER 500B
PIPER PA-28R-201
CONVAIR BT-13A
CESSNA 180
BEECH 76
CESSNA 337
PIPER PA-23-250
CIRRUS SR22
CESSNA 340
RAYTHEON V35A
CESSNA 340A
PIPER PA-32-260
MOONEY M20R
BEECH E-55

MEDFORD, NJ
WAUSEON, OH
SINTON, TX
FORT WORTH, TX
JACKSONVILLE, FL
SPRINGFIELD, IL
LIVINGSTON, TX
CENTRALIA, IL
LEESBURG, FL
ROCK SPRINGS, WY
OCEAN CITY, MD
OWENSBORO, KY
SEQUIM, WA
HARTSVILLE, SC
ENGLEWOOD, CO
VISALIA, CA
BLOUNTVILLE, TN
SO. CHARLESTON, WV
REXBURG, ID
CAVE JUNCTION, OR
PARKVILLE, MO
JASPER, TN
CRYSTAL SPRINGS,
MS
PARK FALLS, WI
VAN NUYS, CA
GAYLORD, MI
SALIDA, CO
ODESSA, TX
ADELANTO, CA
CONROE, TX
CARSON CITY, NV
WINDHAM, CT
WAXHAW, NC
PORT CLINTON, OH
DELAWARE CITY, DE
COUNCIL BLUFFS, IA
SUCHES, GA
BURNSVILLE, NC
CARTERVILLE, MO
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LAX07LA130
DFW08FA228
DFW07FA042
NYC07LA098
DFW06FA180
ANC02FA097
LAX03FA078
NYC07LA210
LAX05LA286
CHI02FA042
MIA08FA021
ATL02FA063
FTW03FA225
MIA01FA151
LAX03LA270
CHI04FA257
ANC08FA079
CHI08FA196
ANC05FA030
LAX01LA303
CHI04FA133
DFW05LA118
DFW06FA021
CHI02FA120
NYC07FA145
NYC01FA212
LAX03FA111
SEA04FA173
ATL07FA010
SEA06FA007
SEA05FA034
CHI08FA039
DFW05FA178
SEA05FA125
NYC01FA109
CHI08FA055
ANC05FA098
FTW01FA104

BEECH 35-B33
AMERICAN CHAMPION (ACAC)
7GCBC
CESSNA T210N
GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-5B
BEECH C24R
PIPER PA-18
BEECH D95A
CESSNA 150J
CESSNA 172
MOONEY M20M
MOONEY M20J
PIPER PA-28-160
CESSNA 310J
MOONEY M-20J
BEECH K35
CESSNA 182T
PIPER PA-18
CZECH AIRCRAFT WORKS SPORT
CRUISER
BEECH K35
CESSNA P206B
CESSNA U206F
CESSNA TR182
PIPER PA-34-220T
CESSNA 182S
CESSNA 182C
PITTS S-2B
BEECH 3NM
BEECH C35
CESSNA 182T
PIPER PA-28-140
CESSNA 182R
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP. SR22
PIPER PA-34-220T
CESSNA 172M
BEECH A-36
CESSNA 310R
MAULE M-7-235
CESSNA 402B

SEDONA, AZ
WICHITA FALLS, TX
AUSTIN, TX
DANVILLE, VA
VIRGINIA BEACH, VA
SKWENTNA, AK
LANCASTER, CA
HAZLETON, PA
YUMA, AZ
EVANSVILLE, IN
FORT MYERS, FL
LAURENS, SC
NEW ORLEANS, LA
MONROE, NC
GERLACH, NV
CHESTERFIELD, MO
WASILLA, AK
NEWARK, IL
LEESBURG, FL
WILLITS, CA
OWATONNA, MN
LITTLE ROCK, AR
TOMBALL, TX
SHEBOYGAN, WI
HIDDENITE, NC
SHIRLEY, NY
ANZA, CA
KALISPELL, MT
ROCKY MOUNT, NC
EVERETT, WA
MONROE, LA
FARIBAULT, MN
NORMAN, OK
YAMHILL, OR
MIDDLETOWN, RI
TRAVERSE CITY, MI
SEWARD, AK
DEL RIO, TX
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IAD03FA045
SEA07FA195
ANC07FA054
FTW04FA083
FTW04FA037
NYC01FA189
NYC03FA205
NYC06FA209
NYC04FA127

BEECH A36
YAKOVLEV YAK-55M
CESSNA 177RG
TAYLORCRAFT BC12-D
PIPER PA-28-181
PIPER PA-46-350
CESSNA 182T
CESSNA 401A
MOONEY M20J

POMONA, NJ
EVERETT, WA
WASILLA, AK
WRIGHTSVILLE, AR
SUGAR LAND, TX
WESTFIELD, MA
CONCORD, MA
WHICK, KY
OXFORD, CT
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Table B2
Turbine Category Accident Set
NTSB
NYC05FA042
DEN05FA051
IAD03FA043

MIA08FA141

AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL
EMBRAER EMB-110P1
BEECH BE-90
BEECHCRAFT B200
ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
1124A
SOCATA TBM700

ATL06FA044

BEECH 200

NYC03FA080
LAX04FA165

DFW08FA057
DEN03FA045
IAD03FA035
IAD04FA021
ANC07FA073
IAD05FA047
SEA05FA025

DASSAULT AVIATION DA-20
MITSUBISHI MU-2B-40
AERIAL PRODUCTIONS INTL. INC.
ACROJET SPECIAL
PIPER PA46-500TP
PIPER PA-46-500TP
SOCATA TBM 700
MITSUBISHI MU-2B-60
PIPER PA-46-350P
PILATUS PC-12/45
CESSNA 208B

DEN01FA094

CESSNA 208B

SEA06FA022
MIA02FA037
LAX06FA071
DFW05FA170
NYC07FA065
LAX07FA150
LAX07FA059

CESSNA 425
CESSNA 208B
LEARJET 35A
BEECH E90
SOCATA TBM 700
CESSNA S550
PIPER PA-46-350P

FTW03FA036

NYC06LA160

CITY, STATE
SWANZEY, NH
RAWLINS, WY
LEOMINSTER, MA
TAOS, NM
KENNESAW, GA
N MYRTLE BEACH,
SC
SWANTON, OH
NAPA, CA
OCEAN CITY, MD
SAN ANTONIO, TX
ALBUQUERQUE, NM
LEESBURG, VA
FERNDALE, MD
SITKA, AK
BELLEFONTE, PA
BELLEVUE, ID
STEAMBOAT
SPRINGS, CO
BELGRADE, MT
BESSEMER, AL
TRUCKEE, CA
NEW ROADS, LA
DARTMOUTH, MA
DILLON, MT
CONCORD, CA
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Table B3
E-AB Category Accident Set
NTSB
DFW07LA032
NYC08LA225
CHI01LA138
MIA08FA052
IAD05LA039
ATL02LA099
IAD02LA089
CHI07LA150
SEA08LA178

SEA06LA134
NYC05LA012
FTW04LA040
LAX06LA170
ATL04LA001
CHI01FA235
LAX04LA106

AIRCRAFT MAKE AND MODEL
NOBLE VANS RV-7A
RANS, INC. RANS S-6ES
BRAULT GLASAIR SH2F
KAYLOR J E/STRAHLMANN R L RV-4
AIR CREATION CLIPPER 912
AERO PARTNERS ONE LLC CA 7SL
PUHL GENESIS
WOOD VANS RV7A
KOLB MARK III
MURPHY AIRCRAFT MFG, LTD.
SR3500 MOOSE
ARGUS AVIATION CA-7
CULVER, AURTHER L. SEAWIND 3000
SCHILLECI RV-6
MOSER GEORG LANCAIR LEGACY
FG
TAYLOR ROYAL T
DOUGLAS ADVENTURE AIR AMPIB
HACKNEY VANS RV-6A
SCHLITTER RANS S-18 STINGER
JOHNSON WALTER A HORNET
PAYNE GILES G-202
COX THORPE T-18

CHI03LA013

WONDRASEK RANS S-10 SAKOTA

CHI08LA123
CHI05LA030
SEA03FA041
ATL05LA078
DFW07FA023
CHI04LA026
DFW05LA102
LAX02LA109
MIA03LA045
DEN07LA108
ATL04LA064

DICKENSON BATHTUB
HEDGE BEDE-4
GRUBERT KIS TRI-R TR-1
EARNEST JODEL D-9
MCCUTCHAN GLASAIR
MASTER DONALD C BD5B
SPEARMAN RAPTOR
TRENTI RV-4
BORNHOFEN TWINJET 1500
SCHWARZ RV-6A
ATKINSON SA 102.5

CHI07LA113
LAX03LA192
ATL07LA073
DFW07LA090
CHI08FA224

CITY, STATE
NORMAN, OK
LAJAS, PR
GREEN BAY, WI
ELKIN, NC
WOODBINE, NJ
MERRITT ISLAND, FL
PETERSBURG, WV
MARYSVILLE, OH
RICHLAND, WA
COTTER, AR
ANGLETON, TX
YANCEYVILLE, NC
SINTON, TX
OSHKOSH, WI
DAVENPORT, WA
PAWTUCKET, RI
CARTHAGE, TX
LLANO, CA
SAINT MARY’S, GA
OSHKOSH, WI
COMPTON, CA
MISSOURI VALLEY,
IA
BROADHEAD, WI
OMAHA, NE
PUYALLUP, WA
MEMPHIS, TN
MINERAL WELLS, TX
TRAVERSE CITY, MI
BOGALUSA, LA
JACUMBA, CA
MELBOURNE, FL
GREELEY, CO
TRENTON, SC
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SEA08LA145
ATL04LA166
ATL04LA158
CHI06FA196
SEA03LA118
MIA01LA170
LAX07LA175
NYC08FA157
LAX05LA069
DEN01FA082
DEN03FA111
CHI01FA244
SEA06FA116
IAD02LA028
NYC08LA001

POULIN L/CULLEN D LANCAIR
LEGACY
SIDNEY FREEBIRD
PITTS S-1
SHAW EUROPA XS
HERRIN HORNET
UNKNOWN DRAGONFLY B
SKYGEAR SKYGEAR
CARTWRIGHT H JR/COTTRELL M RV10
SLIPSTREAM REVELATION
SANDELL ZENITH CH 200
HAMMOND VANS RV-6A
SCHUCHART STODDARD
HAMILTONSH3
LCIV LLC LANCAIR IV-P PROPJET
WILBURN JODEL F-12
LAMBERT JOHN G VARIEZE

MURRIETA, CA
LEXINGTON, TN
DURHAM, NC
OSHKOSH, WI
NEWBERG, OR
LABELLE, FL
CHINO, CA
SEALE, AL
CAMARILLO, CA
CANON CITY, CO
LA JUNTA, CO
OSHKOSH, WI
PROVO, UT
CLARKSVILLE, VA
CHESAPEAKE, VA

